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Modern legal systems are completely dependent on the written and spoken word;
indeed, it would be an interesting philosophical query to ask whether “law” can exist in
any meaningful sense apart from language. It is surprising, therefore, that there are not
more books on the relation of language and law, or interdisciplinary studies of law and
linguistics. Such books are few in number and usually narrow in focus.
John Gibbons has helped fill this gap with Forensic Linguistics: An Introduction
to Language in the Justice System.1 Historically, “forensic linguistics” usually described
actual courtroom evidence presented by linguistics experts, as in verifying a defendant’s
authorship of a ransom note or recorded phone threat. Gibbons, however, uses the term
more expansively, applying it to the entire field of law & linguistics. His book, therefore,
is more comprehensive than the other leading texts in this area (like the well-known
books by Lawrence Solan2 and Peter Tiersma3), giving the reader some exposure to
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almost every facet of the discipline. Most readers will find one or two sections more
interesting than others, for which more in-depth treatment is available elsewhere. To this
extent, the book is successful as an introduction to a large area of knowledge.
Gibbons’ book will prove useful to both lawyers and academicians. There are
large sections devoted to courtroom presentation,4 jury instructions,5 oral testimony by
lay witnesses,6 and examination of written or recorded evidence,7 all of which
practitioners will find enriching. The challenging feature is that linguistics as a science is
quite rigorous, requiring some patience – a trait thatbusy, flustered litigators sometimes
lack. At the least, judges and practitioners who read Gibbons’ work will have a much
better grasp of when a linguistics expert could prove helpful or even pivotal in a case.
Similarly, academicians and policy makers will enjoy the thought-provoking material on
the Plain Language Movement,8 the dual-audience dilemmafor jury instructions,

9

and the

use of language to assert power, position,10 or one’s opponent’s disadvantage before the
law.11 Each of these areas begs for more research and development; hopefully Gibbons’
overview will spawn further inquiry along these lines.
This essay provides a brief overview of this important new work, explaining in a
nutshell the topics covered in Gibbon’s chapters. Two issues Gibbons raises are then
selected for more in-depth discussion: the “audience design” issues presented by jury

3

PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE (1999).
See Gibbons, supra note 1, at 129-161.
5
Id. at 174-81.
6
Id. at 95-107.
7
Id. at 281-308.
8
Id. at 173.
9
Id. at 177-98.
10
Id. at 74-128.
11
Id. at 200-28.
4

2

instructions,12 and the seldom-discussed problems with our ubiquitous institution of court
reporters and trial transcripts.

II. Language and Law
Gibbons opens his book with an interesting discussion of the effects of societal
literacy on the legal system.13 Oral legal traditions14 in traditional cultures are gradually
replaced by writing in the form of statutes, judicial decisions, and court motions or
filings. Writing transforms the law. Standardization becomes prevalent,15 producing
uniformity across a jurisdiction, as well as more consistent outcomes in legal disputes
over time. Greater detail and comprehensiveness become possible as the system depends
less on frail human memories. Perhaps most importantly, writing allows planning with
the respect to the verbiage used to communicate a rule, on a level usually missing in oral
systems.16 As a professional linguist, Gibbons focuses on the linguistic effects of such
planning: one example is “nominalization,” where entire ideas (implied subject and verb)
become condensed into a single word, like “writing”- or “nominalization,” for that
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matter.17 Other effects include an increased explicitness in the logical structure,18 more
frequent use of passive verbs19 (which depersonalize a text, making the ideas more
abstract and universal). Writing also allows for much longer sentences20 – too long and
complex for comprehension when spoken, but manageable for experienced readers.
I would add to this list some legal effects of the “planning” that the written word
offers – more careful selection of words (with ambiguity functioning as a means of
delegating discretion or authority to other actors),21 and forethought about the rule’s
future consequences. These are essential elements of stare decisis and utilitarian
jurisprudence or policy making. The availability of verbal planning also encourages the
professionalization of legal advocates, with significant educational requirements (i.e.,
entry barriers), and increasing unintelligibility of the law for laypersons.
Gibbons also emphasizes the important “decontextualization” effect that writing
has on the law.22 Written statements can be read and interpreted by others who are
completely removed from the original context, which is rare for the spoken word.23 This
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paragraph, for example, is addressed in part to an unknown audience, who, though never
having met the author or having read Gibbon’s book, could find the strings of words and
phrases intelligible and understandable. This decontextualization fosters the development
of ideas like “the rule of law,” as opposed to ad-hoc approaches to settling disputes.24
A special problem that emerges with a primarily written legal system is the need
to transcribe oral testimony or evidence for reference and citation in subsequent legal
documents.25 Transcripts invariably change the content of communication, losing the
inflection, emphasis, and other meaningful information signals that are present in speech
but difficult to capture in print. Sometimes words reduced to print can communicate a
completely different meaning or import when read aloud by another individual in another
setting. The issues presented by transcripts are quite problematic and often overlooked,
and we shall return to this subject for more deliberation at the end of this essay.
Gibbons moves from this background material to the “pursuit of precision”26 in
legal verbiage, explaining the origins of English legal jargon. Jargon is not always bad;
every specialty develops shorthand, shop talk, and technical terms because they allow a
more efficient exchange of information. Miranda warnings provide an illustration – a
standardized speech recited in every case reminds everyone involved of the possible next
steps the proceeding may take. Sometimes very archaic terminology is retained simply
because its meaning is so well-established. In legal documents, terms with well-settled,
narrow meanings reduce the risk of unforeseen interpretations by future readers
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(especially judges) and the chances of unintended results.27 A great deal of law is devoted
to the reduction of uncertainty and unintended outcomes.
Some linguistic traditions are true accidents of history. For example, the tendency
to use verbal “doublets” in legal English comes directly from the historical period
following the Norman Conquest, when official proceedings were conducted in Norman
French, while the parties themselves almost invariably spoke Old English, a Germanic
tongue. This led to the practice of including both the French and Old English words in
every critical phrase in a document; sometimes the Latin term was included as well
(especially in ecclesiastical courts), resulting in a triplet.28 The following are
commonplace examples:29
-

of sound mind (OE) and memory (L)
give (OE), devise (F), and bequeath (OE)
will (OE) and testament (F/L)
goods (OE) and chattels (F)
fit (OE) and proper (F)
save (F) and except (L)
peace (F) and quiet(L)

It is interesting to note that such doublets and triplets occur today in legal contexts
that were once the most important in the feudal system – transfers of property and
contractual agreements. More modern areas of law, such as environmental regulation or
even some areas of criminal law or torts, have fewer occurrences of these linguistic
oddities. Doublets and triplets are a relic of a period when our legal system was, of
necessity, more bi-lingual.
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An amusing section of Forensic Linguistics is the discussion of quirky police
jargon and slang, often consisting of a mixture of “street” terms, numerical code (“Code
10!” or “10-4!”),30 and over-elaboration, the cumbersome attempt to sound more legal or
official through pseudo-precision.31 “A male suspect exited the vehicle” is a police
favorite, where anyone else would say simply say, “A man got out of the car.” Overelaboration is discussed mostly in the chapter entitled “Interaction and Power,”32 a
section that will mostly interest readers who are intrigued by power and subjugations
issues generally. Over-elaboration sometimes also characterizes the oral testimony of
layperson witnesses (and, unfortunately, a few unbecoming lawyers) who are trying to
feign eruditeness or mastery of the confusing legal system around them. To a linguist,
the unnecessary verbiage is the earmark of the uninitiated awkwardly attempting to
compensate for their lack of verbal prowess.33
“Interaction and Power” overlaps with two later chapters, “Language
Disadvantage Before the Law”34 and “Bridging the Gap,”35 both of which focus on the
powerlessness legal language creates for the children, the deaf, the poor, illiterate adults,
and (especially) those for whom English is not a native language – most immigrants and
many indigenous peoples in the United States, Australia, and Great Britain. Gibbons
describes abuses in both the courtroom and the police station, and the growing need for
interpreters in legal settings. This is indeed a pressing crisis in Anglophone countries,
where English illiteracy creates problems not only in criminal cases, but also in eligibility
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hearings for government benefits, immigration cases, and even the Housing docket in
urban areas. A similar concern is the unfortunately commonplace practice of putting
non-lawyers “in their place” (i.e., status reduction) by talking over their heads when
asking questions to elicit testimony or when dispensing legal advice and information.
The downside of these chapters (a third of the book) is that judges or practitioners
looking for linguistic help with statutory interpretation or evidence authentication will
find few practical tips in these pages, although the social justice considerations are
morally compelling.36
What judges and litigators are likely to find useful and practical, however, are the
chapters on “Communication in the Legal System,”37 “Law on Language,”38 and
“Linguistic Evidence.”39 The latter, which is also the last chapter of the book, is
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power that influences subsequent cases and case reports.
Gibbons also examines the “conversation genres” that compose the attorney/client relationship and
police/interviewee relationship. Both the attorney and the police officer attempt to establish rapport and
follow a formalistic structure in order to extract the information they require. The second genre Gibbons
highlights, that of the actors and procedural legal world, is described as the cognitive interview genre. Both
formalistic and informal devices are discussed, as well as the effects that such methods create in the party
answering the questions. Free-flowing exchanges in interviews, as Gibbons points out, enable better
recounting of memory and therefore more factually accurate stories. Jury trials are comprised of three
separate genres- the trial itself, or macro-genre, and two secondary genres- the master narrative and the
witnesses’ narratives. A major difference between normal narratives and legal narratives, according to
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receiving considerable attention in the academic literature at present, and Gibbon
contributes a unique perspective as a linguist.
Apart from forensics or evidentiary issues, the real heartland of the law &
linguistics movement is the study of verbal communication issues in the legal system;
this is the subject most covered by Lawrence Solan and Peter Tiersma.45 Gibbon’s takes
up this subject in earnest in Chapter Five. Although the author subtitles his entire volume
“An Introduction to Language in the Justice System,” this chapter could stand alone as a
primer on the field, especially for time-pressed attorneys; it addresses the problem with
the overall incomprehensibility of legal language, even for well-trained lawyers.46 A full
page is devoted to the Plain English Movement, which has many zealous advocates47 and
a few lonely detractors (including this author),48 and cites several examples of codes and
legal forms being updated so that they are easier to understand.
Of particular interest to those who frequent the courtroom is a substantial
discussion of linguistic problems with jury instructions. Jury instructions are one of the
most common grounds for reversal on appeals. Some of the problems that Gibbons lists
should be unsurprising, such as the confusing use of technical legal terms, double
negatives, endless subordinate clauses, and odd positioning of phrases. These are all
linguistic malefactions for which lawyers are notorious. Other items Gibbons identifies
as deleterious in jury instructions may be new revelations to many readers. For example,
45
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“as to” prepositional phrases (e.g., “if you find the defendant negligent as to his duty….”)
are so commonplace in legal writing that they become second nature for attorneys, almost
unnoticeable, but they are nonetheless confusing and unconventional for laypersons in the
jury. “Whiz deletion” is another daily peccadillo for lawyers: condensing phrases in
order to omit the words “which” and “that.” Gibbons offers the following real-life
example of “whiz deletion” from a contract: “The cost of any such arbitration shall be in
the discretion of the arbitrator and the award of such arbitration shall be a condition
precedent to any legal proceedings in a court of law in respect to any matters hereby
agreed to be the subject of arbitration.”49 There are many things wrong with this horrible
sentence, but Gibbons draws our attention to “hereby agreed to be the subject of
arbitration” – a shortened version of “which are hereby agreed to be the subject…” This
is whiz deletion – lawyers love it for tightening up documents, including proposed jury
instructions, but repeated studies have shown that each occurrence reduces the hearer’s
comprehension of the text.50 The most common form of whiz deletion is the use of a
partial passive immediately following the modified noun or nominalization, as in
“assume the truth of the answers given,” instead of “answers that were given.”51
Sometimes whiz deletions create problematic ambiguities and misunderstandings: “the
man accused,” as an interrupted phrase, can mean either “the man lodged an accusation
against someone,” or (more commonly for lawyers) “the man that is accused of this
crime.” Questions of witnesses can have two meanings, such as, “How many times did
you approach the man on the ground?”52 This can mean either, “approach the man who
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was on the ground,” or “crawl toward the man” (i.e., approach, on the ground, the man).
Sometimes, the lawyers as a group would lean toward one meaning (the former) and nonlawyers as a group would tend toward a different understanding – one that does not
recognize the whiz deletion.
Lawyers and law students are familiar with certain words, like “consideration” in
contracts that have completely different meanings from their everyday usage. What is
less commonly recognized is that certain grammatical constructions could also have this
legal-everyday meaning divide, and be interpreted by most lawyers and mean something
different than most non-lawyers would understand from the same phrase. Settings
plagued by frequent interruptions (like objections by opposing counsel, or agitated crossexaminers) are more likely to leave many sentences unfinished, exacerbating the
ambiguities created by whiz deletions. Gibbons applies similar linguistic problems (whiz
deletions as well as other confusing grammar) to statutes, contracts, Miranda warnings,
and police interrogations.

III.

The Two Audience Dilemma

An additional problem with jury instructions (and other legal writing) is what
Gibbons calls the “two audience dilemma.” Obviously the jury instructions, whether
written or spoken, are intended to communicate something to the jurors themselves.53 At
the same time, judges know that these instructions are often scrutinized by an appellate
court, and may want to tailor the instructions to please the readers at the next echelon. It
is very difficult to write effectively for two audiences at the same time, particularly when
53
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the audiences have vastly different levels of legal training and expertise. Normally an
attempt to cater to one audience automatically detracts from the linguistic expectations of
the other audience.
Another way of framing the “two audience dilemma” with regards to jury
instructions (and here I respectfully depart from Gibbons’ description), is to view this as
a single audience situation comprised of both “addressees” (the jury) and “bystanders” or
“overhearers” (the appellate judges).54 When one knowingly communicates to both at
once, the communication can be crafted to convey different meanings to each group of
the audience.55 The jury knows (sort of) what the judge said; but the appellate tribunal
knows what the judge said to the jury – and the judge, in turn, knows they know this. We
handle these verbal orchestrations in everyday conversation; we shoot a knowing glance
to a colleague or make a comment that is an “inside joke” to some of the bystanders, even
though the humor is lost on the addressee.
What we cannot do, however, is convey multiple meanings to multiple addressees
at once.56 The multiple layers of communication that occur in jury instructions can be
distinguished by looking at the intended audience and the intended meaning. A helpful

54
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analytical tool for this process is the concept of m-intentions developed by H. P. Grice.
Grice used the phrase “m-intentions” to describe the subjective meaning effect a speaker
intends to produce in the hearer. 57 For example, the “m-intended effect” of imperative
communication is that “the hearer should intend to do something (with of course the
ulterior intention on the part of the utterer that the hearer should go on to do the act in
question).”58 The “m-intentions” must be the same for all, even if there is an
indeterminate set of possible addressees.
When a form of communication has a composite audience, as do jury instructions,
someone must be in the position of the addressee – the recipient of the first level of
meaning or m-intentions – and the others must be bystanders or overhearers.59 Suppose,
for example, that the jury instruction is (taken from a recent Supreme Court case): "A
person, who kills another person in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to
defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, kills unlawfully, but is not
guilty of murder.”60 The first level of meaning for the jury (the m-intention) is something
like, “You should not convict the defendant of murder if you decide that she actually
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believed she was acting in self defense, even if she was obviously incorrect.” The
message to the appellate court, on the other hand, is something like, “The judge informed
the jury that a person, who kills another person . . .” This is the second level of meaning.
It includes or incorporates the first message (the m-intention), but contains the additional
information that “this was told to the jury.”61
The distinction is important, because referring to a “two audience dilemma” can
create the mistaken impression that judges must simultaneously communicate to two
addressees, with somewhat different messages to each. This is not an accurate model.
The jury is the addressee here, and their comprehension of a certain meaning is essential;
otherwise the statement is a misfire, a betrayal of what linguists call the “felicity
conditions.” Appellate judges are bystanders or overhearers. The meaning conveyed to
them must contain the element “X was conveyed to the jury.” For the jury, however, there
is no need – no felicity conditions – that the given message is also being sent to other
judges. This is irrelevant to their receipt of a completed communication. The address to
the jury stands on its own; the message to the appellate court requires the presence of a
jury as the original addressees.
By way of analogy, think of the communication from a judge to his “audience” as
an electrical circuit. When the judge transmits the instructions to the jury, a circuit is
complete, and the current can flow to power a lamp. It is irrelevant to their accurate
comprehension whether anyone subsequent to them receives or understands the message.
Legal “addressees,” then, are the members of a audience who can apprehend the intended
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message without regard to other hearers.62 “Bystanders” or “overhearers” – let us call
them “reviewers” in the context of jury instructions – are in receipt of a message that is
contingent on another hearer. In fact, it is contingent on another hearer who is noncontingent, an “addressee.”
The problem of audience design for jury instructions, therefore, is not so much a
dual audience dilemma as much as a matter of a single audience comprised of addressees
and reviewers. These two groups are not mutually exclusive, when viewed properly.
There does not have to be a “dilemma” at all. The dilemma, if present, is that dual but
distinct “addressees” (as opposed to audiences) are indeed mutually exclusive, and judges
framing their own task in such terms will be unable to perform both communications
effectively. Improper framing of the task or goal will force judges to shortchange the
jurors’ comprehension, or to ignore the reviewers’ legitimate expectations.

IV. Audience Design and Statutes
Gibbons, however, avoids using of the phrase “two audience problem” in
connection with statutes, although he does not disavow the idea, either.63 I have argued
elsewhere64 that statutes are inherently addressed to the state itself, not to the citizenry;
the citizenry are in the position of bystanders or overhearers (but not necessarily
62

Of course, addressees also receive a tertiary message, when they are aware of the presence of
bystanders/overhearers: “The message just communicated to us as addressees was spoken in the hearing of
Y.” This may, in certain contexts, be important information – as when a person is warned in the presence
of an official “witness” to the confrontation, as some employers do when terminating an employee. But it
does not change the original, non-contingent message that was communicated to the addressee directly,
without circumstantial implications.
63
See Gibbons, supra note 1, at 183, discussing the application of the two audience dilemma to
contracts. Contracts may present the closest example to dual addressees (the other party and the courts and
enforcers of the terms), but our legal rules explicitly favor the original “meaning to the parties themselves,”
making this more akin to jury instructions. The contract is a communication to the parties themselves
about their promises and duties, with a consciousness of the “reviewer”- the courts.
64
See generally Stevenson, supra note 48.
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“reviewers”). This reversal in audience design is an important distinction between
statutes and jury instructions, with important linguistic implications for each. The fact
that Gibbons does not apply the two audience dilemma to statutes is actually unusual (but
fortunate, in my view). A prevailing school of thought holds that statutes have dual
distinct addressees, both citizens and judges;65 this position was famously advanced in an
influential article by Meir Dan-Cohen about “acoustic separation” in criminal statutes.66
Dan-Cohen argued, as have many subsequent writers, that each criminal statute contains
“conduct rules” (portions addressed to the person on the street), and “decisions rules”
(portions addressed to judges regarding the proper disposition of cases). These messages,
directed to distinct addressees, are supposedly interwoven seamlessly, and sometimes lie
latent within the same words or phrases;67 the two sides of his “acoustic separation”

65

See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,” J. LEG.
STUD. 257, 261 (1974):
Rules are addressed to two audiences: people who might violate (or be accused of
violating) the law, and participants in the process of determining whether a violation has
occurred (judges, lawyers, etc.). the effects of the choice between rule and standard on
the first group we shall call effects on “primary behavior,” as contrasted with the effects
of the choice on law enforcement and other activities in the legal system.
At the same time, elsewhere in their article, Ehrlich and Posner emphasize the importance of
specificity in the rules for state actors (like prosecutors and law enforcement), because of the
increased efficiency of court proceedings; this fits nicely with the model presented here. See id. at
264.
66
Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law,
97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). Dan-Cohen assumes the law is addressed to the citizenry, and seeks to show
that it is also addressed to the courts. See id. at 628 (“We can successfully account for the normative
constraints that the law imposes on judicial decision making only if we impute to the legal system an
additional relevant norm whose norm-subject is the judge and whose norm-act is the act of judging or
imposing judgment.”). Confusingly, after positing a theory of statutory audience design, the examples he
uses are mostly judge-made rules, not statutes: the common-law excuse of duress, the “act at your own
peril,” principle, and the maxim that “ignorance of the law is no excuse, but vagueness in the law can be.”
He also focuses on a practical application for statutory rape, an anomaly in our legal system.
67
See id at 631:
First, conduct rules and decision rules may often come tightly packaged in
undifferentiated mixed pairs. . . [R]adical separation is unnecessary in the real world. As
Bentham pointed out, a single statutory provision may simultaneously guide both conduct
and decision and may thus function as both a conduct rule and a decision rule. A criminal
statute, to use Bentham's example, conveys to the public a normative message that certain
behavior should be avoided, coupled with a warning of the sanction that will be applied
to those who engage in the prohibited conduct. The same statutory provision also speaks
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really become indistinguishable. Under his model, judges must use the entire “conduct
rule” portion of the statute to determine how the “rule” applies to the facts.68 Similarly,
criminal defendants argue that the case against them should be dismissed because the
state violated the rules prescribing its behavior.69 Both parties, in other words, must
listen to and heed both sides of the “acoustic separation” model, which seems to collapse
the distinction and undermine the model’s usefulness. 70 From a linguistic perspective,
this binary-addressee model is very problematic.

to judges: it instructs them that, upon ascertaining that an individual has engaged in the
forbidden conduct, they should visit upon him the specified sanction.
68
See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY 234-35. Kelsen argued that all “application” of the law by
judges was, in a technical sense at least, “making” law for the specific arrangement of facts in that case.
Interestingly, he asserted that this was true whether the judge was operating within a common-law system
or the “code” systems prevalent in Europe and South America. Interestingly, Bentham saw the “lawmaking” function of common-law courts as very undesirable and pushed for the Continental model to
replace it. Kelsen argues in this section that there is not as much practical difference between the two as
one might think, or as much as Bentham thought.
69
For example, even though Miranda warnings are clearly a requirement placed upon the police
(to the extent that this requirement is still upheld by the courts), this state-actor-addressed rule is so
important to citizens that people speak of “Miranda Rights.” Where is the “decision rule” and where is the
“conduct rule” here? The same rule is perhaps equally important for both parties, albeit in different ways.
It is important to police as a direct rule about how to conduct themselves. It is a life-saving rule for many
defendants, but only indirectly, to the extent that it invalidates the actions of the arresting officers. Paul
Robinson alludes to the same problem:
[M]any people cannot discern the rules of conduct. And many people who think they
know the answers will be wrong. Can one lawfully shoot a basement burglar? Must one
help the burglar when he is bleeding and helpless? The rules governing the justification
of force in the defense of one’s property or premises and the rules defining one’s
affirmative duties to act are notoriously complex. In other instances, principles of
adjudication are drafted in a form that may be appropriate for a rule of conduct but that
does not accommodate the complex and multifaceted analyses that determine an actor’s
blameworthiness for violating a rule of conduct.
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 63 (1997).
70
Dan-Cohen is not the first to argue for a dual-addressee model for statutes – he cites important
earlier writers like Jeremy Bentham: “To say to the judge, ‘Cause to be hanged whoever in due form of law
is convicted of stealing,’ is, though not a direct, yet as [sic] intelligible a way of intimating to men in
general that they must not steal, as to say to them directly, ‘Do not steal.’” JEREMY BENTHAM,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, Ch. 17 §2, n.7 § VIII. Bentham’s true
position on this is confusing; a few paragraphs earlier, he offers the same example to distinguish different
addressees of the laws, asserting that different addressees requires two different laws:
A law confining itself to the creation of an offense, and a law commanding a punishment
to be administrated in case of the commission of such an offense, are two distinct laws,
not parts (as they seem to have been generally accounted hitherto) of one and the same
law. The acts they command are altogether different; the persons they are addressed to
are altogether different. Instance, “Let no man steal”; and “Let the judge cause whoever
is convicted of stealing to be hanged.”
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The communication of prohibitions to the citizenry is by implication only.71
Citizens are in the position of bystanders or overhearers, not addressees, of statutes and
regulations. Recalling the distinction made above in the discussion about jury
instructions, the addressee is the one for whom the communication circuit is complete
upon receipt, regardless of receipt by others. With statutes, the communication – the law
– is effective and whole when it is in the hands of the judge, prosecutors, and law
enforcements officers. It is not very relevant whether the defendant herself is in receipt
of the communication, because ignorance of the law is no excuse.72 On the other hand,
the law does not affect the citizens unless and until it is used by the relevant state actors –
judge, enforcement agent, etc. To return to my analogy of an electrical circuit, the
lawmaker-judge circuit is complete without the defendant involved in the circuit, but the
lawmaker-citizen circuit is not complete without the necessary state actors, who must be
within the circuit itself.
The so-called “notice requirement” muddies this analysis somewhat. There is a
general due process obligation for the state to publish the law in order to preserve its
legitimacy – a sense of fairness and justice.73 The notice requirement, however,

Id. at Ch. 17 §2, n.7 § VI. Bentham appears to concede that written laws are really statements to
officials about whom to punish, when, and how.
71
Kelsen bluntly states that the influence on a citizen’s behavior is indirect. HANS KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 61 (1945).
72
Hans Kelsen claimed that the part of a law directed at the would-be offender is unnecessary and
redundant:
An example: “One shall not steal; if somebody steals, he shall be punished.” If it is
assumed that the first norm which forbids theft is valid only if the second norm attaches a
sanction to theft, then the first norm is certainly superfluous in an exact exposition of law.
If at all existent, the first norm is contained in the second, which is the only genuine legal
norm.
Id.
73
Bentham was very concerned about this problem, and included "notoriety" (being easily
knowable) as one of the seven "Properties or qualities which... a body of laws, designed for all purposes
without exception, must be possessed of." Letters from Jeremy Bentham to the Citizens of the Several
American United States, reprinted in JEREMY BENTHAM, 'LEGISLATOR OF THE WORLD': WRITINGS ON
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mandates only constructive notice (a legal fiction) rather than actual notice, because
ignorance of the law is no excuse. The notice requirement does not hold up well as a due
process defense in court,74 because even the scantiest evidence of publication or token of
notice satisfies the requirement. This is true even where it would have been practically
impossible for the defendant to access the information. Given its inapplicability to
individual, subjective knowledge, the notice requirement seems to bolster the argument
that the citizen is not the addressee. It implies instead that the citizenry as a whole is in

CODIFICATION, LAW, AND EDUCATION 117-123 (Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris eds., 1998). In
Bentham's view, this meant phrasing the law in clear, easily intelligible language and organizing the
sections in such a way as to facilitate memorization by the populace.
74
For example, consider the seemingly contradictory positions on this point taken by Richard
Posner in different contexts. In his treatise on law and economics, he argues that the notice requirement is
indispensable. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW at 267 (6th ed. 2003):
[L]aw must be public. If the content of a law became known only after the events to
which it was applicable occurred, the existence of the law could have no effect on the
conduct of the parties subject to it. The economic theory of law is a theory of law as
deterrence, and a threat that is not communicated cannot deter.
But see Torres v. INS, 144 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1998), involving a Guatemalan alien who had entered a
sham marriage in order to prolong his legal stay in the United States. When the INS discovered his ruse, it
denied his application for permanent residency and, after a series of unsuccessful applications for asylum,
ordered him deported. Id. at 473. The final deportation order occurred on December 17, 1996; there had
been a long-standing rule that deportees could appeal such orders into federal circuit court within ninety
days, so Torres did so on March 14, 1997. Unbeknownst to Mr. Torres or his attorney, the time period had
been changed pursuant to a rider on the “Nurse’s Act,” §309(c)(4)(C), that was passed on October 11,
1996. Pub. L. 104-32, 110 Stat. 3657 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1). The change made his petition
overdue, although under the previous, published rule it would have been timely.
Judge Posner opens his discussion in the case with the statement, "The idea of secret laws is
repugnant. People cannot comply with laws the existence of which is concealed." The deportee truly could
not have known that the deadline for filing an immigration petition had suddenly changed, decreasing from
ninety to thirty days; the new regulation was effective despite being unavailable in print form or on
computer databases such as Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis. Even the appellant’s attorney would have discovered
only by a minor miracle, it seemed:
West Publishing Company had not yet published the reform act in or as a supplement to
the United State Code Annotated. And a search of the Immigration and Nationality Act
oneither Westlaw or Lexis -Nexis (or both), the standard computerized databases for
legal research, would not have disclosed that the 90-day provision had been repealed. A
search of Westlaw's Public Laws database would have revealed both the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act and the Extension of Stay in the United States for
Nurses Act, but neither of these titles would have alerted the reader to the fact that the
acts had changed the period within which to seek judicial review of orders under the
immigration laws, although the full title of the Nurses Act does imply a connection to
immigration.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit ruled against the appellant, finding that there was enough token notice to
justify application of the rule to an individual who was not aware it had been changed.
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the position of a bystander, perhaps a “reviewer” (from the standpoint of public
accountability for lawmakers) like the appellate judges are for jury instructions.75

V.

The Problem with Transcripts

The American legal system, more so than its European or Latin American
counterparts, is a mixture of written and oral statement. Especially in litigation, our legal
system depends on a large amount of oral evidence (testimony and depositions), oral
argumentation, and oral negotiation.
The intersection of these two sides of language in law is found in transcripts;
court reporters reduce oral statements to writing.76 Similarly, police interrogators reduce
confessions and statements to writing in the form of signed statements, although these are
more pervious to challenge than transcripts. “Reduce” is the operative word. Gibbons
offers a description of how drastically the spoken words change when put into a written
form that is readable and conventional. He offers the following example:77

Version 1: Linguists’ phonetic transcription78
j s(1.5) (.3)d ma n(.3) w sdisw sdis(.5)his d(.2)d nwarid
nwarid nwari(.5)j n a (.2) is i (.2) kitst um t ps t

75

For more discussion of audience design and the true addressee for statutes, see generally
Stevenson, supra note __, at 116-40; Drury Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. __ (2004) (forthcoming). The pioneering work in this area, applying audience design to
legal writings, was done by Henry Smith, supra note 12, at 1133-48.
76
Court reporting is an institution in itself, with its own national associations, codes of ethics,
reference literature, and websites
77
Gibbons, supra note 1, at 29-30. It is taken from an interview with an Australian man who
migrated from Lebanon in adulthood.
78
Also used in the Oxford English Dictionary.
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Version 2: Standard dictionary phonetic transcription
oi ära … ur ,, d man .. wos dis wos dis wos dis .. hi sed .. d n wuri d n wuri d n
wuri .. y n .. oi s kits t much upset
Version 3: Accurate wording and conventional spelling
I ask, er, the man, what’s this, what’s this, what’s this. He said, don’t worry, don’t
worry, don’t worry, you know. I say kids too much upset.

Version 4: More written:
I ask the man, “What’s this?” He said, “Don’t worry.” I say, “Kids too much
upset.”

Version 5: Standard written:
I asked the man, “What’s this?” He said, “Don’t worry.” I said, “The kids will be
very upset.”

All of the above are transcriptions of the same statement. The first, of course, is the most
accurate, but is unreadable to most of us. The progression illustrates that there is really a
continuum of transcription approaches, with “accurate” on one end and “readable” on the
other. Such a visible continuum also highlights the tension between accuracy and
readability – the two are really in conflict, and any place on the continuum represents a
trade-off between the two.79 My concern is that in the legal community we regularly
delude ourselves and view court and deposition transcripts as something more than they
are. The critical role court reporters play in the legal system is seldom discussed by
commentators; Gibbons’ insights could ignite some genuine controversy, if widely read.
Our legal system has a strong preference for readability. Readability streamlines
review, lowering information and transaction costs; it is more efficient. This preference,
79

Gibbons, supra note 1, at 30-31.
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however efficient, has the somewhat troubling effect of pushing transcripts in a direction
away from accuracy, imposing standardization through editing by court reporters. This is
not to accuse court reporters of dishonesty. They are service providers, and their clients –
courts and lawyers – have a clear preference about the level of editing they prefer. Those
who prepare training materials for court reporters are aware of the game: “To edit or not
to edit is not the question; every reporter does is in greater or less degree.”80
Some level of editing probably becomes unconscious for reporters over time,
given the routine, mechanical nature of their task; many court reporters would probably
deny that they are changing anything. Speech-to-text computer software performs a
similar task; but the program is designed to match the spoken input to a menu of possible
words or phrases with conventional spellings; even the software performs some
automatic editing and translation, not pure transcription.
Spoken statements include hesitation, variations in volume to reflect emotion,
regional accents (useful in identifying the speaker’s background), and repetitions.
Gibbons points out that repetitions are crucial for expressing emphasis in speech, but are
disfavored in writing. Written repetitions are tedious to read, and few judges or lawyers
would complain if a court reporter reduced repeated words or phrases into a single
statement. Yet some of the original meaning, or m-intention, is lost in this process.
More troubling is the fact that transcribers do not stay at a fixed position on the
accuracy-readability continuum, which further manipulates the impression of the
statements. Gibbons observes:
When judges or lawyers make “grammatical errors,” recorders generally
correct them, while for witnesses they may not do so. The federal
guidelines for reporters notes that they are expected to correct the
80

Id. at 31, citing GUIDELINES OF NATIONAL SHORTHAND REPORTERS ASSOCIATION 26 (1983).
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“ungrammatical and carelessly phrased remarks” of lawyers and judges,
while the “testimony of ignorant or illiterate witnesses should be literally
rendered.”81

The result is that the transcripts portray the legal professional as generally
eloquent and artful, and the laypersons as inarticulate, even stupid. The differences in
linguistic decorum already present from the differences in training and expertise between
lawyers and witnesses are exacerbated.

An Example: People v. Caruso
Apart from the power-play issues presented by such recording disparities, judges
sometimes infer conclusions about the mental process or mental state of defendants based
on the distorted impression created by court reporting. A particularly blatant illustration
of this is the famous opinion of Justice Andrews in People v. Caruso,82 a murder trial of
an Francesco Caruso, Italian immigrant living in Brooklyn in the 1920’s. The
defendant’s son was deathly ill; the family physician prescribed some medication, which
apparently the pharmacist found questionable but dispensed nonetheless. The boy’s
condition deteriorated in the following hours; the doctor was delayed in arriving at the
81

Id. at 32. The original source is ENGLISH 26-27, (Professional Education Series, National
Shorthand Reporters Association, 1983):
It is well settled that the reporter should make every effort to eliminate obviously bad
grammar from his transcript. The only questions are—whose utterances shall enjoy the
privilege of being edited? And how bad must grammar be to warrant the reporter’s
departing from a strictly verbatim report? The general rule advanced by the advocates of
liberal editing by the reporters is that the utterances of the lay witness should be recorded
strictly verbatim but that those of judges, lawyers, and expert witnesses (usually
professional men, entitled by presumption to a certain elegance of expression) should be
polished by the skillful grammarian-reporter.
Professor Anne Walker commented on this section: "[t]he NSRA text on English . . . underwent review of
the National Shorthand Reporters Association Books and Tapes Committee in the summer of 1989. The
committee, of which I am a member, recommended that the text be neither reprinted nor endorsed in the
future." Anne Graffam Walker, Language at Work in the Law: The Customs, Conventions, and Appellate
Consequences of Court Reporting, in LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Judith Levi, ed., 1990).
82
246 N.Y. 437, 159 N.E. 390 (N.Y. 1927).
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house, and the boy’s life ebbed away. The physician arrived hours after the boy had died,
and was informed by the distraught family that the child had already expired, at which he
expressed some sort of shock or disbelief (the defendant indicated he laughed or smirked
in disbelief). The father flew at the physician, choking and then stabbing him; at trial he
was convicted of premeditated murder.83 The question on appeal was not the defendant’s
responsibility for killing the doctor, but whether the attack was premeditated. Andrews, a
master draftsman of legal prose, opted in this case to insert a large block of Mr. Caruso’s
court testimony transcript:
"About four o'clock in the morning," he testified, "my child was standing up to the bed,
and asked me to, he says, 'Papa' he said 'I am dying.' I say that time, I said, 'You don't
die.' I said 'I will help you every time.' The same time that child he will be crazy -- look
like crazy, that time -- don't want to stay any more inside. All I can do, I keep my child in
my arms, and I held him in my arms from four o'clock until eight o'clock in the morning.
After eight o'clock in the morning the poor child getting worse -- the poor child in the
morning he was" -- (Slight interruption in the testimony while the defendant apparently
stops to overcome his emotion.) "The poor child that time, and he was asking me, 'Papa,'
he said, 'I want to go and sleep.'
"So I said, 'All right, Giovie, I will put you in the sleep.' I take my Giovie and I put him
in the bed, and he started to sleep, to wait until the doctor came, and the doctor he never
came. I waited from ten o'clock, the doctor he never came." Then after trying in vain to
get in touch with the doctor he sent for an ambulance from a drug store. "When I go
home I seen my child is got up to the bed that time, and he says to me, 'Papa, I want to
come with you.' I take my child again up in my arms and I make him look to the back
yard to the window. He looked around the yard about a couple of minutes and after, when
he looked around, he says to me, 'Papa, I want to go to sleep again.'
"I said, 'All right, Giovie, I will put you in the sleep.' I put my child on the bed. About a
few seconds my child is on the bed, my child says to me, he says, 'Papa, I want to go to
the toilet.'
"I said, 'All right, Giovie, I will take you to the toilet.' So I was trying to pick up the
child and make him go to the toilet, when I held that child I felt that leg -- that child
started to shake up in my arms. My wife know about better than me -- I cannot see good
myself in the face, so she tell what kind of shakes he do, and she has told me, she says,
'Listen, Frank, why, the child has died already.'
"I said, 'All right, you don't cry. No harm, because you make the child scared.' That time
I go right away and put the child on the bed. When I put the child, before I put my hand
to the pillow, my child said to me, 'Good-bye, Papa, I am going already.'
"So that time I put my hands to my head -- I said, 'That child is dead. I don't know what I
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Id. at 443.
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am going to do myself now.' That time I never said nothing, because I said, 'Jesus, my
child is dead now. Nobody will get their hands on my child." -D'84

The sentences capture, or re- create, the immigrant’s broken English. Notice the reporting
of Mr. Caruso’s stereotypical, ungrammatical use of the present tense throughout. The
sentences are short and chronologically disjointed. The staccato effect, combined with
the misused verb tenses, create the impression that Mr. Caruso thinks in a series of
flashed scenes. Now I am at my son’s bedside. Now I am walking to the bathroom with
my child. Now I am standing at the windowsill. Now I am putting the child back in bed.
Now I am walking him across the room again.
Of course, this is not necessarily the way Mr. Caruso’s mind worked – it is just
the way he talked. English was not his native language. Exclusive use of the present
tense, and short sentence fragments are characteristics of those straining to speak in a
second language learned in adulthood (as in the transcription-style examples above). It is
quite possible that Mr. Caruso would have expressed himself in longer sentences, with
appropriate verb tenses and nuanced increments, had he testified in Italian.
The issue on appeal, however, was whether his attack on the doctor was
premeditated: “The real issue was as to state of mind of the defendant . . . whether the
killing was the result of premeditation and deliberation. What Caruso in fact believed and
thought, what he had in mind at the time of the homicide, is the issue . . .”85 Justice
Andrews was a masterful writer; he could certainly have penned a succinct fact summary
without resorting to the inclusion of a transcript excerpt filled with clumsy phrasing. Yet

84
85

Id. at 441-442.
Id. at 443.
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Andrews wanted to acquit;86 he was irritated with the prosecution for introducing
irrelevant, inflammatory evidence about the defendant’s immigration status and the
victim’s young widow and children, and suspected that this had unfairly swayed the
jury.87 At least two hours had elapsed between the time the child died and the arrival of
the physician, giving Caruso ample time to deliberate and premeditate.88 Premeditation is
a subjective mental activity that the jury must infer from the circumstances, and time to
deliberate before a killing is often the basis for this inference. Andrews concedes that
“where sufficient time exists very often the circumstances surrounding the homicide
justify -- indeed require -- the necessary inference.”89 He justified the reversal, however,
on the rule that “[d]eliberation and premeditation imply the capacity at the time to think
and reflect, sufficient volition to make a choice, and by the use of these powers, to refrain
from doing a wrongful act”90 – which he did not believe could have been present with
Mr. Caruso. He mentions his skepticism about the defendant’s mental prowess as a basis
for giving credence to his statement at the time of arrest, “before it is likely that a man of
Caruso's mentality would be preparing a false defense.”91
It seems clear, therefore, that Andrews included the transcript excerpt to reinforce
the notion that the defendant was too much of a simpleton to be capable of premeditation
and deliberation, even if he had the time and the motive. The transcript could not have
been better in this regard; the short disjointed sentences create the impression of a person
whose mind works minute-to-minute, reacting to the immediate environment, incapable
86

Id. at 440 (“This judgment must be reversed.”).
Id. at 444.
88
Id. at 445. (“[The jury] considered their verdict for six hours -- twice returning for definitions of
homicide and of deliberation and premeditation. Time to deliberate and premeditate there clearly was.
Caruso might have done so. In fact, however, did he?”).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 446.
91
Id. at 442.
87
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of scheming or complicated planning. The irregular use of present-tense verbs casts
doubt on his ability to think in temporal terms, whether past (in recounting the story) or
future (the essence of premeditation).
The problem is that this is manipulative, even deceptive, on Justice Andrews’
part. We speak differently than we write; some linguists consider written English a
different language than spoken English. Most of us would seem less articulate, and
therefore less crafty or intelligent, the more accurately a transcript recorded sounds we
uttered. In the case of an immigrant, this effect is even more pronounced. Caruso’s level
of English acquisition was comparable to that of a pre-school child learning his native
tongue; recording his speech irregularities creates the (probably) false impression that he
had the mind of a child as well. The transcript tells us nothing about the way he thought,
or the way he would have explained himself in his own language. Yet the transcript was
cited in an opinion where the only issue to resolve was the defendant’s mental state, his
ability to premeditate a murder over the course of two hours. It is presented to create an
impression – falsely – about the defendant’s mind. Perhaps Caruso indeed deserved to be
acquitted or to be charged with a lesser offense;92 the point is that the transcripts were
misused to achieve this goal, regardless of the merits of the result.
The irony is that transcripts seem so rigorous and empirical, like raw data that is
free from interpretation and bias, unlike anything else in the litigation context.
Transcripts have an air of neutrality, which makes their misuse even more devious. We
have our guard up when a lawyer presents his argument – it is the attorney’s job to
advocate zealously for his client, and everyone assumes attorneys will spin facts, slant
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The case was, in fact, remanded for a new trial to determine if Caruso was guilty of voluntary
manslaughter (i.e., a crime of passion) or second-degree murder without premeditation. Id. at 446.
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evidence, and present everything in as biased a manner as possible. I fear that the parties
in the courtroom do not have their guard up in a similar way when reviewing transcript
evidence, even though any attempt to reduce speech to text requires interpretation,
editing, and the imposition of conventions. Examples abound; I have presented one case
where the latent danger of transcripts is particularly easy to see.

VI. Conclusion
The study of law and linguistics is more than dissecting words or parsing verbs. It
includes important issues of how language is being used and abused in our legal system.
Examining genres of legal writing or noting the specific register of oration used in
courtrooms has some value, but there remain larger unsettled issues – such as the true
audience for jury instructions and the proper role of transcripts – to which linguistics can
contribute. Each of these areas is fertile ground for additional, badly-needed research.
Gibbons starts us on this road. The book would be a superb addition to any
serious library, and a useful tool for getting acquainted with an area many find unfamiliar
or intimidating. It covers a wider range of topics than the previous books in the field,
offering the reader exposure to many areas for further inquiry. Forensic Linguistics
should prove illuminating for judges and litigators, and helpful for academicians wanting
to enrich their approach to research and theory.
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